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Chapter 20
Trust and Recommendations
Patricia Victor, Martine De Cock, and Chris Cornelis
Abstract Recommendation technologies and trust metrics constitute the two pillars
of trust-enhanced recommender systems. We discuss and illustrate the basic trust
concepts such as trust and distrust modeling, propagation and aggregation. These
concepts are needed to fully grasp the rationale behind the trust-enhanced recom-
mender techniques that are discussed in the central part of the chapter, which focuses
on the application of trust metrics and their operators in recommender systems. We
explain the benefits of using trust in recommender algorithms and give an overview
of state-of-the-art approaches for trust-enhanced recommender systems. Further-
more, we explain the details of three well-known trust-based systems and provide a
comparative analysis of their performance. We conclude with a discussion of some
recent developments and open challenges, such as visualizing trust relationships in
a recommender system, alleviating the cold start problem in a trust network of a rec-
ommender system, studying the effect of involving distrust in the recommendation
process, and investigating the potential of other types of social relationships.
20.1 Introduction
Collaboration, interaction and information sharing are the main driving forces of the
current generation of web applications referred to as ‘Web 2.0’ [48]. Well-known ex-
amples of this emerging trend include weblogs (online diaries or journals for sharing
ideas instantly), Friend-Of-A-Friend1 (FOAF) files (machine-readable documents
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describing basic properties of a person, including links between the person and ob-
jects/people they interact with), wikis (web applications such as Wikipedia2 that
allow people to add and edit content collectively) and social networking sites (vir-
tual communities where people with common interests can interact, such as Face-
book3, dating sites, car addict forums, etc.). In this chapter, we focus on one specific
set of Web 2.0 applications, namely social recommender systems. These recom-
mender systems generate predictions (recommendations) that are based on informa-
tion about users’ profiles and relationships between users. Nowadays, such online
relationships can be found virtually everywhere, think for instance of the very pop-
ular social networking sites Facebook, LinkedIn and MSN4.
Research has pointed out that people tend to rely more on recommendations from
people they trust (friends) than on online recommender systems which generate rec-
ommendations based on anonymous people similar to them [57]. This observation,
combined with the growing popularity of open social networks and the trend to in-
tegrate e-commerce applications with recommender systems, has generated a rising
interest in trust-enhanced recommendation systems. The recommendations gener-
ated by these systems are based on information coming from an (online) trust net-
work, a social network which expresses how much the members of the community
trust each other. A typical example is Golbeck’s FilmTrust [16], an online social
network combined with a movie rating and review system in which users are asked
to evaluate their acquaintances’ movie tastes on a scale from 1 to 10. Another exam-
ple is the e-commerce site Epinions.com, which maintains a trust network by asking
its users to indicate which members they trust (i.e., their personal ‘web of trust’) or
distrust (‘block list’).
Trust-enhanced recommender systems use the knowledge that originates from
such trust networks to generate more personalized recommendations: users receive
recommendations for items rated highly by people in their web of trust (WOT), or
even by people who are trusted by these WOT members, etc. (see e.g. [7, 16, 46,
61]). The main strength of most of these systems is their use of trust propagation
and trust aggregation operators; mechanisms to estimate the trust transitively by
computing how much trust a user a has in another user c, given the value of trust for
a trusted third party b by a and c by b (propagation), and by combining several trust
estimates into one final trust value (aggregation). Propagation and aggregation are
the two key building blocks of trust metrics, which aim to estimate the trust between
two unknown users in the network.
Apart from trust, in a large group of users (each with their own intentions, tastes
and opinions) it is only natural that also distrust occurs. For example, Epinions first
provided the possiblity to include users in a personal WOT (based on their quality
as a reviewer), and later on also introduced the concept of a personal ‘block list’,
reflecting the members that are distrusted by a particular user. The information in
2 See www.wikipedia.org
3 See www.facebook.com
4 See www.linkedin.com, or www.msn.com
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the WOT and block list is then used to make the ordered list of presented reviews
more personalized. From a research perspective, too, it is generally acknowledged
that distrust can play an important role [21, 62, 68], but much ground remains to be
covered in this domain.
Recommendation technologies and trust metrics constitute the two pillars of trust-
enhanced recommender systems. Since the former are covered in much detail in
other chapters of this handbook, we will restrict ourselves to the essentials. On the
other hand, we do not assume that most readers are familiar with the trust research
area. Therefore, in the following section, we start with a discussion and illustra-
tion of the basic trust concepts, namely trust and distrust modeling, propagation
and aggregation; concepts that are needed to fully grasp the rationale behind the
trust-enhanced recommender techniques as they are discussed in Section 3. This is
the central part of the chapter, and focuses on the application of trust metrics and
their operators in recommender systems. We explain the benefits of using trust in
recommender algorithms and give an overview of state-of-the-art approaches for
trust-enhanced recommender systems. Furthermore, we explain the details of three
well-known trust-based systems and provide a comparative analysis of their perfor-
mance. After this overview of classical trust-enhanced research, in Section 4, we
focus on some recent developments and open challenges, such as visualizing trust
relationships in a recommender system, alleviating the cold start problem in a trust
network of a recommender system, studying the effect of involving distrust in the
recommendation process, and investigating the potential of other types of social re-
lationships. The chapter is concluded in Section 5.
20.2 Computational Trust
In this section we provide the reader with a basic introduction to the field of compu-
tational interpersonal trust, i.e., trust that can be computed among two individuals
in a social trust network. This implies that we cover trust models (how to represent
trust and how to deal with distrust; Section 2.1), trust propagation operators (how to
estimate the trust between two individuals by using information coming from users
that are on the connecting path between them; Section 2.2.1), and trust aggrega-
tion (how to combine trust values generated by multiple propagation paths; Section
2.2.2). We illustrate these concepts by classical and recent examples.
Note that this overview is inexhaustive; for instance, we do not cover trust up-
dating or trust bootstrapping. Our primary goal is to familiarize the reader with the
main concepts of the trust computation area, and as such to lay the foundation for
an easy understanding of the rationale and details of the trust-enhanced recommen-
dation techniques presented in Section 3.
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20.2.1 Trust Representation
Trust models come in many flavours and can be classified in several ways. In this
chapter we focus on two such classifications, namely probabilistic versus gradual
approaches, and representations of trust versus representations of both trust and dis-
trust. Table 20.1 shows some representative references for each class.
A probabilistic approach deals with a single trust value in a black or white fash-
ion — an agent or source can either be trusted or not — and computes a probability
that the agent can be trusted. In such a setting, a higher suggested trust value cor-
responds to a higher probability that an agent can be trusted. Examples can, among
others, be found in [66] in which Zaihrayeu et al. present an extension of an in-
ference infrastructure that takes into account the trust between users and between
users and provenance elements in the system, in [55] where the focus is on com-
puting trust for applications containing semantic information such as a bibliography
server, or in contributions like [32] in which a trust system is designed to make
community blogs more attack-resistant. Trust is also often based on the number of
positive and negative transactions between agents in a virtual network, such as in
Kamvar et al.’s Eigentrust for peer-to-peer (P2P) networks [28], or Noh’s formal
model based on feedbacks in a social network [44]. Both [25] and [51] use a sub-
jective logic framework (discussed later on in this section) to represent trust values;
the former for quantifying and reasoning about trust in IT equipment, and the latter
for determining the trustworthiness of agents in a P2P system.
On the other hand, a gradual approach is concerned with the estimation of trust
values when the outcome of an action can be positive to some extent, e.g. when
provided information can be right or wrong to some degree, as opposed to being
either right or wrong (e.g. [1, 11, 15, 21, 35, 59, 68]). In a gradual setting, trust val-
ues are not interpreted as probabilities: a higher trust value corresponds to a higher
trust in an agent, which makes the ordering of trust values a very important factor
in such scenarios. Note that in real life, too, trust is often interpreted as a gradual
phenomenon: humans do not merely reason in terms of ‘trusting’ and ‘not trusting’,
but rather trusting someone ‘very much’ or ‘more or less’. Fuzzy logic [29, 65] is
very well-suited to represent such natural language labels which represent vague
intervals rather than exact values. For instance, in [59] and [31], fuzzy linguistic
terms are used to specify the trust in agents in a P2P network, and in a social net-
work, respectively. A classical example of trust as a gradual notion can be found in
[1], in which a four-value scale is used to determine the trustworthiness of agents,
viz. very trustworthy - trustworthy - untrustworthy - very untrustworthy.
The last years have witnessed a rapid increase of gradual trust approaches, rang-
ing from socio-cognitive models (for example implemented by fuzzy cognitive maps
in [12]), over management mechanisms for selecting good interaction partners on
the web [59] or for pervasive computing environments (Almena´rez et al.’s PTM [3]),
to representations for use in recommender systems [15, 35], and general models tai-
lored to semantic web applications [68].
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Table 20.1: Classification of trust models
trust only trust and distrust
probabilistic
Kamvar et al. [28]
Jøsang et al. [25]Richardson et al. [55]
Zaihrayeu et al. [66]
gradual
Abdul-Rahman et al. [1]
Falcone et al. [12] Victor et al. [62]
Golbeck [15] Guha et al. [21]
Massa et al. [35]
While trust is increasingly getting established, the use and modeling of distrust re-
mains relatively unexplored. Most approaches completely ignore distrust (see for
example [31, 32, 43, 55, 66]), or consider trust and distrust as opposite ends of the
same continuous scale (see e.g. [1, 19, 59]). However, in agent network theory there
is a growing body of opinion that distrust cannot be seen as the equivalent of lack of
trust [10, 13, 34]. Moreover, work in the psychology area has repeatedly asked for a
re-examination of the assumption that positive- and negative-valent feelings are not
separable [8, 50, 52], and some researchers even claim that trust and distrust are not
opposite, but related dimensions that can occur simultaneously [9, 33].
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one probabilistic model that considers
trust and distrust simultaneously: in Jøsang’s subjective logic [24, 25], an opinion
includes a belief b that an agent is to be trusted, a disbelief d corresponding to a
belief that an agent is not to be trusted, and an uncertainty u. The uncertainty factor
leaves room for ignorance, but the requirement that the belief b, the disbelief d and
the uncertainty u sum up to 1, rules out options for inconsistency even though this
might arise quite naturally in large networks with contradictory sources [60].
Examples of gradual models for both trust and distrust can be found in [11, 21,
62, 68]. Guha et al. use a couple (t;d) with a trust degree t and a distrust degree
d, both in [0,1]. To obtain the final suggested trust value, they subtract d from t
[21]. However, as explained in [62], potentially important information is lost when
the trust and distrust scales are merged into one. For example, the scenario (0:2;0)
in which there is partial trust collapses to 0:2, but so does the scenario (0:6;0:4)
that exhibits both partial trust and partial distrust. To deal with the issues in Guha’s
and Jøsang’s approach, Victor et al. proposed an extension of [11] in which trust
and distrust values are drawn from a bilattice [14]. Such a bilattice structure is able
to solve trust problems caused by presence of distrust or lack of knowledge, and
provides insight into knowledge problems caused by having too little or too much,
i.e. contradictory, information [62].
Trust and trust models have been used in many fields of computer science, and
also in a wide range of applications; a nice overview can be found in [6] in which
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Artz and Gil classify trust research in four major areas: models that use policies to
establish trust (enforcing access policies, managing credentials, etc.), general trust
models such as [12] and [68], models for trust in information sources such as [66],
and reputation-based trust models. The latter category includes, among others, re-
search that uses the history of an agent’s actions or behaviour (see e.g. [28, 46]), and
work that computes trust over social networks, such as [21, 36]. In fact, the trust-
enhanced recommender techniques that we will describe in Section 20.3 all belong
to this class.
20.2.2 Trust Computation
In online trust networks, most other users are typically unknown to a specific user.
Still there are cases in which it is useful to be able to derive some information on
whether or not an unknown user can be trusted, and if so, to what degree. In the
context of recommender systems for instance, this is important if none of the known
users has rated a specific item that the user is interested in, but there are some ratings
available by unknown users (who are a member of the trust network). For instance,
the number of people that users have in their web of trust in Epinions is estimated
to be around 1.7 on average. The total number of users of Epinions on the other
hand well exceeds 700 000 [61]. In other words, the WOT of a user only contains
a very tiny fraction of the user community. Hence, it would be very useful to be
able to tap into the knowledge of a larger subset of the user population to generate
recommendations.
Trust metrics compute an estimate of how much a user should trust another user,
based on the existing trust relations between other users in the network. Various
types of trust metrics exist in the literature; we refer to [68] for a good overview. In
that paper, Ziegler and Lausen classify trust metrics along three dimensions: group
versus scalar metrics, centralized versus distributed approaches, and global versus
local metrics. The first dimension refers to the way trust relations are evaluated,
while the second classification is based on the place where the trust estimations are
computed. The last dimension refers to the network perspective: trust metrics can
take into account all users and trust relationships between them when computing a
trust estimation (see e.g. [28, 44, 55]), or only rely on a part of the trust network,
hence taking into account personal bias (e.g. [15, 21, 35]). The trust-enhanced tech-
niques of Section 3 belong to the latter type.
20.2.2.1 Propagation
Trust metrics usually incorporate techniques that are based on the assumption that
trust is somehow transitive. We call these techniques trust propagation strategies.
Let us illustrate this with Figure 20.1: if user a trusts user b (whom we call a trusted
third party, or TTP for short), and TTP b trusts user c, then it is reasonable to assume
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Fig. 20.1: Propagation example
that a should trust c to a certain degree. This basic propagation strategy is known
as atomic direct propagation, and is the type that we will focus on in the remainder
of this chapter5. However, trust is not always transitive. For instance, if Jane trusts
Alice to give her a good-looking haircut and Alice trusts John to fix her bicycle, this
does not imply that Jane trusts John to fix bicycles, nor to give a nice haircut.
But, in the same context/scope, and under certain conditions, trust can be tran-
sitive [26]. Suppose e.g. that Jane is new in town and wants to have a haircut. Jane
trusts that Alice can find a good hairdresser, while Alice trusts Mariah to be a good
hairdresser. Hence, Jane can trust Mariah to be a good hairdresser. This example
also shows us that a distinction must be made between trust in a user’s competence
to assess the trustworthiness of a user (functional trust, Alice trusting Mariah), or
trust in a user’s competence to recommend/evaluate a good recommender agent (re-
ferral trust, Jane trusting Alice) [1, 26]. As explained in [26], it is the referral part
that allows trust to become transitive. A propagation path can then be seen as a tran-
sitive chain of referral trust parts, which ends with one functional trust scope.
When dealing with trust only, in a probabilistic setting, multiplication is very of-
ten used as the standard propagation operator, see for instance [55]. This is also the
case in gradual settings [3, 15, 21], but there is a wider spectrum of propagation
operators available, dependent on the goal or the spirit of the application. This is
illustrated by the following example.
5 For a discussion of other trust propagation strategies, such as cocitation, transpose trust, or cou-
pling, we refer to [21].
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Example 20.1. Suppose that, on a scale from 0 to 1, user a trusts user b to the degree
0.5, and that b trusts user c to the degree 0.7. Then, in a probabilistic setting (using
standard multiplication), trust propagation yields 0.35. In a fuzzy logic approach
however, the final trust estimate depends on the choice of the operator: for instance,
the rationale that a propagation chain is only as strong as its weakest link leads to the
use of the minimum as propagation operator, hence yielding 0.5 as the propagated
trust estimate. The use of the Łukasiewicz conjunction operator on the other hand,
i.e. max(t1+ t2 1;0), will yield 0:2. Like with multiplication, this propagated trust
value reflects the individual influences of both composing links, as opposed to only
the weakest link.
Other trust propagation work includes techniques based on fuzzy if-then rules
[31, 59], on the theory of spreading activation models (Ziegler and Lausen’s Apple-
seed [68]), or on the semantic distance between a TTP’s trust and a user’s perception
of the TTP’s trust [1].
Of course, not all propagation paths have the same length. In Figure 20.1 e.g., there
are two paths leading from the source user a to the target user c. If we suppose that
all trust links in the network denote complete trust, then intuitively we feel that the
estimated trust of the second propagation path should be lower than that of the first
path, since we are heading further away from the source user. This idea of ‘trust de-
cay’ [20] is often implemented in propagation strategies. For instance, in Ziegler’s
approach this is incorporated through a spreading factor [68], Golbeck only takes
into account shortest paths and ignores all others [15], and in applications that only
work with binary trust (instead of gradual), Massa determines the propagated trust
based on a user’s distance from a fixed propagation horizon [35].
In the case of atomic direct propagation, if a trusts b and b trusts c, a might trust c
to a certain degree. Analogously, if a trusts b and b distrusts c, it seems clear that
a should somehow distrust c. However, the picture gets more complicated when we
also allow distrust as the first link in a propagation chain. For example, if a distrusts
b and b distrusts c, there are several options for the trust estimation of a in c: a pos-
sible reaction is to infer that a should trust c, since a might think that distrusted ac-
quaintances of users he distrusts are best to be trusted (‘the enemy of your enemy is
your friend’). Or a should distrust c because a thinks that someone that is distrusted
by a user that he distrusts certainly must be distrusted. Yet another interpretation of
distrust propagation is to ignore information coming from a distrusted user b, be-
cause a might decide not to take into account anything that a distrusted user says.
Guha et al. call the second strategy additive distrust propagation, and the first
multiplicative distrust propagation [21]. They discuss the negative side effects of
multiplicative propagation (also see [68]), but conclude that it cannot be ignored be-
cause it has some philosophical defensibility. Besides Guha et al., other researchers
also proposed operators that adhere to the first strategy, such as Victor et al.’s ap-
proach using fuzzy logic concepts [62] or Jøsang et al.’s opposite belief favouring
discount operator [27]. Examples of the last strategy can be found in [21, 27, 62].
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Example 20.2. Like with trust propagation, approaches to distrust propagation are
intimately linked to the representations of trust and distrust at hand. Let us assume
the use of a couple (t;d)with a trust degree t and a distrust degree d, both in [0;1]. In
this representation, (1;0) corresponds to full trust, (0;1) corresponds to full distrust,
and (0;0) corresponds to full ignorance, or full lack of knowledge. Gradual values
such as in (0:5;0:2) denote partial trust 0:5, partial distrust 0:2 and partial lack of
knowledge 1  0:5  0:2 = 0:3. Assume that the trust score of user a in user b is
(t1;d1) and, likewise, that the trust score of user b in user c is (t2;d2). The trust
score (t3;d3) of user a in user c can then be calculated as follows [62]:
(t3;d3) = (t1 t2; t1d2)
This propagation strategy reflects the attitude of listening to whom you trust and
not deriving any knowledge through a distrusted or unknown third party. Below are
some examples of propagated trust scores. Each row correspond to a possible trust
score of a in b, each column to a trust score of b in c, and the corresponding table
entry contains the propagated trust score of a in c.
(0.0,0.0) (0.0,1.0) (1.0,0.0) (0.5,0.2)
(0.0,0.0) (0.0, 0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0)
(0.0,1.0) (0.0, 0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0)
(1.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,1.0) (1.0,0.0) (0.5,0.2)
(0.5,0.2) (0.0,0.0) (0.0, 0.5) (0.5,0.0) (0.25,0.1)
In [25] the same propagation technique is used to combine pairs of beliefs and dis-
beliefs. Furthermore, subtracting the distrust degree from the trust degree, the prop-
agated trust score collapses to t1(t2 d2), a propagation scheme proposed in [21].
Example 20.3. Alternatively, the trust score (t3;d3) of user a in user c can be calcu-
lated as [62]:
(t3;d3) = (t1 t2+d1d2  t1 t2d1d2; t1d2+d1 t2  t1d2d1 t2)
In this propagation strategy, t3 is computed as the probabilistic sum of t1 t2 and
d1 d2, while d3 is the probabilistic sum of t1  d2 and d1 t2. The underlying
assumption is that a distrusted user is giving the wrong information on purpose.
Hence user a trusts user c if a trusted third party tells him to trust c, or, if a distrusted
third party tells him to distrust c (i.e. the enemy of your enemy is your friend).
Subtracting the distrust degree from the trust degree yields (t1   d1) (t2   d2),
a distrust propagation scheme put forward in [21]. Below are some examples of
propagated trust scores.
(0.0,0.0) (0.0,1.0) (1.0,0.0) (0.5,0.2)
(0.0,0.0) (0.0, 0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0)
(0.0,1.0) (0.0, 0.0) (1.0,0.0) (0.0,0.1) (0.2,0.5)
(1.0,0.0) (0.0,0.0) (0.0,1.0) (1.0,0.0) (0.5,0.2)
(0.5,0.2) (0.0,0.0) (0.2, 0.5) (0.5,0.2) (0.28,0.2)
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All these approaches illustrate the fact that, so far, no consensus has yet been reached
on how to propagate distrust. Different operators yield different results depending
on the interpretation, thus revealing part of the complex problem of choosing an
appropriate propagation scheme for the application at hand.
20.2.2.2 Aggregation
Besides propagation, a trust metric must also include an aggregation strategy. After
all, in large networks it will often be the case that not one, but several paths lead
to the user for whom we want to obtain a trust estimate. When this is the case, the
trust estimates that are generated through the different propagation paths must be
combined into one aggregated estimation; see for instance the situation depicted in
Figure 20.2.
Metrics that only work with trust mostly use classical aggregation operators
such as the minimum, maximum, weighted sum, average, or weighted average
[1, 3, 19, 28, 43, 44, 55]. The main benefit of weighted operators is that they give
us the opportunity to consider some sources (TTPs or propagation paths) as more
important than others. In other words, weighted operators provide a way to model
the aggregation process more flexibly.
Aggregation of both trust and distrust has not received much attention so far.
Only Jøsang et al. have proposed three aggregation operators (called consensus op-
erators) for the subjective logic framework [27]; however, they assume equally im-
portant users.
Fig. 20.2: Aggregation example
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Note that propagation and aggregation very often must be combined together, and
that the final trust estimation might depend on the way this is implemented. Let us
take a look at Figure 20.2. There are two ways for user a to obtain a trust estimate
about user c from user b. The first possibility is to propagate trust to agent c, i.e.,
to apply a propagation operator on the trust from b to d and from d to c, and to
apply one from b to e, from e to f , and from f to c, and then to aggregate the two
propagated trust results. In this scenario, trust is first propagated, and afterwards
aggregated (i.e., first propagate then aggregate, or FPTA). A second possibility is to
follow the opposite process, i.e., first aggregate and then propagate (FATP). In this
scenario, the TTP b must aggregate the estimates that he receives via d and e, and
pass on the new estimate to a. It is easy to see that in the latter case the agents/users
in the network receive much more responsibility than in the former scenario, and
that the trust computation can be done in a distributed manner, without agents hav-
ing to expose their personal trust and/or distrust information.
Example 20.4. In Figure 20.2 there are three different paths from a to c. Assume that
all trust weights on the upper chain are 1, except for the last link which has a trust
weight of 0:9. Hence, using multiplication as propagation operator, the propagated
trust value resulting from that chain is 0.9. Now, suppose that a trusts b to degree
1, and that b trusts d to the degree 0.5 and e to the degree 0.8. That means that
the propagated trust value over the two chains from a to c through b are 1 0:5
0:4= 0:2 and 10:80:60:7 0:34 respectively. Using the classical average as
aggregation operator, FPTA yields a final trust estimate of (0:9+ 0:2+ 0:34)=3 =
0:48. On the other hand, if we would allow b to first aggregate the information
coming from his trust network, then bwould pass the value (0:2+0:34)=2= 0:27 on
to a. In a FATP strategy, this would then be combined with the information derived
through the upper chain in Figure 20.2, leading to an overall final trust estimate of
(0:9+0:27)=2 0:59.
20.3 Trust-Enhanced Recommender Systems
The second pillar of trust-enhanced recommendation research is the recommender
system technology. Recommender systems are often used to accurately estimate
the degree to which a particular user (from now on termed the target user) will
like a particular item (the target item). These algorithms come in many flavours
[2, 54]. Most widely used methods for making recommendations are either content-
based (see Chapter 3) or collaborative filtering methods (see Chapter 5). Content-
based methods suggest items similar to the ones that the user previously indicated a
liking for [56]. Hence, these methods tend to have their scope of recommendations
limited to the immediate neighbourhood of the user’s past purchase history or rating
record for items. For instance, if a customer of a DVD rental sevice so far has only
ordered romantic movies, the system will only be able to recommend related items,
and not explore other interests of the user. Recommender systems can be improved
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significantly by (additionally) using collaborative filtering, which typically works by
identifying users whose tastes are similar to those of the target user (i.e., neighbours)
and by computing predictions that are based on the ratings of these neighbours [53].
In the following section, we discuss the weaknesses of such classical recom-
mender systems and illustrate how they can be alleviated by incorporating a trust
network among the users of the system. These advanced, trust-based recommenda-
tion techniques adhere closest to the collaborative filtering paradigm, in the sense
that a recommendation for a target item is based on ratings by other users for that
item, rather than on an analysis of the content of the item. A good overview of classic
and novel contributions in the field of trust systems, and trust-aware recommender
systems in particular, can be found in the book edited by Golbeck [17].
20.3.1 Motivation
Despite significant improvements on recommendation approaches, some important
problems still remain. In [37], Massa and Avesani discuss some of the weaknesses of
collaborative filtering systems. For instance, users typically rate or experience only
a small fraction of the available items, which makes the rating matrix very sparse
(since a recommender system often deals with millions of items). For instance, a par-
ticular data set from Epinions contains over 1 500 000 reviews that received about
25 000 000 ratings by more than 160 000 different users [61]. Due to this data spar-
sity, a collaborative filtering algorithm experiences a lot of difficulties when trying
to identify good neighbours in the system. Consequently, the quality of the gener-
ated recommendations might suffer from this. Moreover, it is also very challenging
to generate good recommendations for users that are new to the system (i.e., cold
start users), as they have not rated a significant number of items and hence cannot
properly be linked with similar users. Thirdly, because recommender systems are
widely used in the realm of e-commerce, there is a natural motivation for producers
of items (manufacturers, publishers, etc.) to abuse them so that their items are rec-
ommended to users more often [67]. For instance, a common ‘copy-profile’ attack
consists in copying the ratings of the target user, which results in the system think-
ing that the adversary is most similar to the target. Finally, Sinha and Swearingen
[57, 58] have shown that users prefer more transparent systems, and that people tend
to rely more on recommendations from people they trust (‘friends’) than on online
recommender systems which generate recommendations based on anonymous peo-
ple similar to them.
In real life, a person who wants to avoid a bad deal may ask a friend (i.e., someone
he trusts) what he thinks about a certain item i. If this friend does not have an opin-
ion about i, he can ask a friend of his, and so on until someone with an opinion about
i (i.e., a recommender) has been found. Trust-enhanced recommender systems try to
simulate this behaviour, as depicted in Figure 20.3: once a path to a recommender
is found, the system can combine that recommender’s judgment with available trust
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information (through trust propagation and aggregation) to obtain a personalized
recommendation. In this way, a trust network allows to reach more users and more
items. In the collaborative filtering setting in Figure 20.4, users a and bwill be linked
together because they have given similar ratings to certain items (among which i1),
and analogously, b and c can be linked together. Consequently, a prediction of a’s
interest in i2 can be made. But in this scenario there is no link between a (or c) and
i3 or, in other words, there is no way to find out whether i3 would be a good recom-
mendation for agent a. This situation might change when a trust network has been
established among the users of the recommender system.
The solid lines in Figure 20.4 denote trust relations between user a and user b,
and between b and user c. While in a scenario without a trust network a collaborative
filtering system is not able to generate a prediction about i3 for user a, this could be
solved in the trust-enhanced situation: if a expresses a certain level of trust in b, and
b in c, by propagation an indication of a’s trust in c can be obtained. If the outcome
would indicate that agent a should highly trust c, then i3 might become a good rec-
ommendation for a, and will be highly ranked among the other recommended items.
This simple example illustrates that augmenting a recommender system by includ-
ing trust relations can help solving the sparsity problem. Moreover, a trust-enhanced
system also alleviates the cold start problem: it has been shown that by issuing a few
trust statements, compared to a same amount of rating information, the system can
generate more, and more accurate, recommendations [35]. Moreover, a web of trust
can be used to produce an indication about the trustworthiness of users and as such
make the system less vulnerable to malicious insiders: a simple copy-profile attack
will only be possible when the target user, or someone who is trusted by the target
user, has explicitly indicated that he trusts the adversary to a certain degree. Finally,
the functioning of a trust-enhanced system (e.g. the concept of trust propagation)
is intuitively more understandable for the users than the classical ‘black box’ ap-
proaches. A nice example is Golbeck’s FilmTrust system [16] which asks its users
to evaluate their acquaintances based on their movie taste, and accordingly uses that
information to generate personalized predictions.
Fig. 20.3: Recommending an item
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Fig. 20.4: Trust relations in recommender systems
20.3.2 State of the Art
All these examples illustrate that establishing a trust network among the users of
a recommender system may contribute to its success. Hence, unsurprisingly, some
attempts in this direction have already been made, see for example [15, 23, 30, 37,
46, 49, 51]. Trust-enhanced recommender systems can roughly be divided into two
classes, according to the way the trust values are obtained. The first group uses
information coming from a trust network that is generated by the direct input of the
users, i.e., by explicitly issuing trust statements. Examples can be found in [16, 23,
37]. Such a strategy allows to use trust propagation and aggregation in the network
to infer the final trust values that are needed in the recommender algorithm. On
the other hand, the second group does not require the user to estimate the trust
in his acquaintances. Instead, trust values are computed automatically, for instance
based on a user’s history of making reliable recommendations [30, 46], or based on
transitivity rules for user-to-user similarity [49].
In the behavioral literature, the concept of trust is well defined; see for example
Mayer et al.’s framework in which ability, benevolence, integrity and propensity to
trust are determined as its key factors [40], or McAllister’s work that distinguishes
between cognition-based and affect-based trust [41]. However, in the recommen-
dation research area, trust is often used as an umbrella term for a wide range of
relationships between people, especially when dealing with automatic computation
of trust values. In these cases, trust is being used to denote a variety of concepts,
ranging from perceived similarity of tastes, over reputation, to the assessment of a
user’s competence.
In Section 20.4 we further discuss this in more detail ; in this section, we focus on
the basics of both strategies (i.e., mining a trust network and automatic computation
of trust values), and illustrate the techniques with representative work in each class.
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20.3.2.1 Mining a Trust Network
The most common trust-enhanced recommender strategies ask their users to explic-
itly issue trust statements about other users. Take for instance Moleskiing [7], a ski
mountaineering community site which uses FOAF-files that contain trust informa-
tion on a scale from 1 to 9 [19], or the e-commerce site Epinions.com which orders
reviews based on a trust network that it maintains by asking its users to indicate
which members they trust (i.e., their personal web of trust) or distrust (block list).
Another well-known example is Golbeck’s FilmTrust [16], an online social network
combined with a movie rating and review system in which users are asked to evalu-
ate their acquaintances’ movie tastes on a scale from 1 to 10.
All these systems exploit the relations in the trust network to determine which
opinions or ratings should weigh more or less in the recommendation process. In
other words, this group of algorithms uses the trust estimates (obtained by propa-
gation and aggregation) as weights in the decision process. This weighting can be
done in several ways. In this section, we focus on the two most commonly used
strategies, namely classical weighted average and adaptations of the collaborative
filtering mechanism, and illustrate each of them with one well-known state-of-the-
art implementation.
Trust-based weighted mean In a recommender system without a trust network, a
simple recommendation algorithm that needs to estimate how well a target user will
like a target item i can compute the average rating for i by taking into account the
ratings ru;i from all the system’s users u who are already familiar with i. This base-
line recommendation strategy can be refined by computing a trust-based weighted
mean. In particular, by including trust values ta;u that reflect the degree to which
the raters u are trusted, the algorithm allows to differentiate between the sources. In
fact, it is only natural to assign more weight to ratings of highly trusted users. The
formula is given by Equation (20.1), in which pa;i denotes the predicted rating of
target item i for target user a, and RT represents the set of users who evaluated i and









TidalTrust This formula is at the heart of Golbeck et al.’s recommendation algo-
rithm [15]. The novelty of this algorithm mainly lies in the way the trust estimates
ta;u are inferred; a trust metric that they have called TidalTrust. In [18], the authors
give an overview of the observations that have lead to the development of Tidal-
Trust. In each experiment, they ignored an existing trust relation from a user a to
a user c, and focused on all paths that connect a to c. In short, by comparing the
propagated trust results from these paths with the original, hidden, trust value, they
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noticed that (1) shorter propagation paths yield more accurate trust estimates, and
that (2) paths containing higher trust values yield better results too.
Hence, taking into account the first observation, only allowing shorter paths
should yield the best results. However, in some cases only a few users will be reach-
able if a limit is set on the path length. This trade-off is incorporated through a
variable path length limit: the shortest path length that is needed to connect the tar-
get user with a user u that has rated the item (i.e., a rater) becomes the path depth
of the algorithm. Like this, the depth of the breadth-first search varies from one
computation to another.
One way of addressing the second observation (higher trust values on the path
yield better trust estimates) is to limit the information such that it only comes from
the most trusted users. However, every user has its own behaviour for issuing trust
values (one user may give the maximum value quite often while another one never
does), and in addition, it will often be the case that only a few paths contain the same
high trust value. This is why Golbeck et al. opted to incorporate a value that repre-
sents the path strength (i.e., the minimum trust rating on a path), and to compute the
maximum path strength over all paths leading to the raters. This maximum (max) is
then chosen as the minimum trust threshold for participation in the process.
The TidalTrust formula is given by Equation (20.2), in which WOT+(a) rep-
resents the set of users for whom a’s trust statement exceeds the given threshold
max. This means that each user in the process computes its trust in another user as
a weighted mean, and only takes into account information from users that he has









TidalTrust is a recursive algorithm; the trust value ta;u is recursively computed as the
weighted mean of trust values tv;u for all TTPs v that are the first link on the shortest
path from a to u. The users assure that the maximum path depth is not exceeded
by keeping track of the current path length. Note that this algorithm belongs to the
class of gradual trust approaches and is an example of a local trust metric.
Golbeck et al. have shown that using trust-based weighted mean in combination
with TidalTrust does not necessarily offer a general benefit over computing the av-
erage or applying collaborative filtering, but that it does yield significantly more
accurate recommendations for users who disagree with the average rating for a spe-
cific item (see e.g. [15, 18]).
Trust-based collaborative filtering Whereas Golbeck’s approach is an example
of a weighted average implementation, another class of trust-enhanced systems is
tied more closely to the collaborative filtering algorithm. In collaborative filtering,
a rating of target item i for target user a can be predicted using a combination of the
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ratings of the neighbours of a (similar users) that are already familiar with item i









The unknown rating pa;i for item i and target user a is predicted based on the mean
ra of ratings by a for other items, as well as on the ratings ru;i by other users u
for i. The formula also takes into account the similarity wa;u between users a and u,
usually calculated as Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (PCC) [22]. In practice, most
often only users with a positive correlation wa;u who have rated i are considered. We
denote this set by R+. However, instead of a PCC-based computation of the weights,
once can also infer the weights through the relations of the target user in the trust
network (again through propagation and aggregation); see Formula (20.4) which
adapts Formula (20.3) by replacing the PCC weights wa;u by the trust values ta;u.










We call this alternative trust-based collaborative filtering. Note that, because the
weights are not equal to the PCC, this procedure can produce out of bounds results.
When this is the case, pa;i is rounded to the nearest possible rating.
MoleTrust Formula (20.4) is at the basis of Massa et al.’s recommendation algo-
rithm which incorporates a new trust metric, calledMoleTrust [38]. This metric was
mainly devised for testing purposes, which reveals itself in tunable parameters and
cycle removing. MoleTrust consists of two phases. In the first stage, cycles in the
trust network are removed, while the second stage includes the actual trust compu-
tation. Since it is often the case that a large number of trust propagations must be
executed in trust experiments (think e.g. of the large test sets from Epinions.com),
it is much more efficient to remove trust cycles beforehand, so that every user only
needs to be visited once for obtaining a trust prediction.
The removing of the cycles transforms the original trust network into a directed
acyclic graph, and hence the trust prediction for ta;u can be obtained by performing
a simple graph walk: first the trust of the users at distance 1 is computed (i.e., direct
trust information), then the trust of the users at distance 2, etc. Note that because of
the acyclic nature of the graph, the trust value of a user at distance x only depends
on the already computed trust values of the users at distance x 1.
The trust of the users at distance 2 or more is calculated in a way similar to Gol-
beck et al.’s algorithm, i.e. formula (20.2). However, the details of the breadth-first
implementation differ significantly. In TidalTrust, a user u is added to WOT+(a)
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Table 20.2: Characteristic features of two state-of-the-art recommendation ap-
proaches that mine a trust network to predict a rating for target user a and target
item i, based on ratings of other users u for i
TidalTrust MoleTrust
propagation multiplication multiplication




maximum length of dynamic (shortest path) static (horizon)
propagation path
trust threshold dynamic (strongest chain) static
entry requirement for TTP v is on a shortest v is on a path from
v in propagation process path from a to u a to u within the horizon




only if he is on a shortest path from target user a to target item i. On the other hand,
in MoleTrust,WOT+(a) includes all users who have rated the target item and that
can be reached through a direct or propagated trust relation. But trust is not com-
puted for all eternity: before the computation begins, one must assign a value d to
the ‘propagation horizon’ parameter. Like this, only users who are reachable within
distance d are taken into account. Another important input parameter of MoleTrust
is the trust threshold for participation in the process (unlike the dynamic max value
in TidalTrust), which is for example set to 0.6 (on a scale from 0 to 1) in the experi-
ments reported in [38].
Note that, analogous to TidalTrust, MoleTrust belongs to the class of gradual lo-
cal trust metrics. In their experiments, Massa and Avesani have illustrated that Mo-
leTrust provides better trust estimates than global trust metrics such as eBay’s6,
especially when it comes down to estimating the trust in controversial users (who
are trusted by one group and distrusted by another) [38]. They also showed that Mo-
leTrust yields more accurate predictions for cold start users, compared to a classical
collaborative filtering system [35, 36].
Golbeck’s and Massa’s approach are two typical examples of trust-enhanced rec-
ommender techniques that use explicit trust information. Table 20.2 summarizes
their most prominent characteristics. Other recommendation approaches that also
mine a trust network can be found in, among others, [23, 63].
6 www.ebay.com
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20.3.2.2 Automatic Trust Generation
The algorithms discussed in the previous section require explicit trust input from the
users. As a consequence, the applications that use such an algorithm must provide
a means to obtain the necessary information; think e.g. of FilmTrust or Moleskiing.
However, this might not always be possible or feasible. In such cases, methods that
automatically infer trust estimates, without needing explicit trust information, might
be a better solution. An example of such a system can be found in [47].
Most commonly, these approaches base their trust generation mechanism on the
past rating behaviour of the users in the system. More specifically, deciding to what
degree a particular user should participate in the recommendation process is influ-
enced by his history of delivering accurate recommendations. Let us exemplify this
with the well-known approach of O’Donovan et al. [46].
Profile- and item-level trust Our intuition tells us that a user who has made a lot
of good recommendations in the past can be viewed as more trustworthy than other
users who performed less well. To be able to select the most trustworthy users in the
system, O’Donovan introduced two trust metrics, viz. profile-level and item-level
trust, reflecting the general trustworthiness of a particular user u, and the trustwor-
thiness of a user u with respect to a particular item i, respectively. Both trust metrics
need to compute the correctness of u’s recommendations for the target user a. In
particular, a prediction pa;i that is generated only by information coming from u
(hence u is the sole recommender) is considered correct if pa;i is within e of a’s
actual rating ra;i.
The profile-level trust tPa;u for u seen from a’s perspective is then defined as the
percentage of correct recommendations for a made by u. Remark that this is a very
general trust measure; in practice it will often occur that u perfoms better in rec-
ommending a set of specific items. To this aim, O’Donovan also proposed the more
fine-grained item-level trust t ia;u, which measures the percentage of recommenda-
tions for item i that were correct. Hence, in such automated approaches, trust values
are not generated via trust propagation and aggregation, but are based on the ratings
that were given in the past. Remark that O’Donovan’s methods, too, are local trust
metrics. The way the values are obtained can be seen as probabilistic.
Trust-based filtering Similar to other trust-enhanced techniques, the values that
are obtained through the trust metric are used as weights in the recommendation
process. Just like Massa, O’Donovan et al. focus on trust-based adaptations of col-
laborative filtering. In [46] they investigate several options, such as combining the
obtained trust values with PCC information. An alternative to this scheme is to use
trust values as a filter, so that only the most trustworthy neighbours participate in the
recommendation process. This strategy is called trust-based filtering, see Formula
(20.5) in which wa;u denotes the PCC and RT+ = RT \R+.









In other words, only users whose item/profile-level trust exceeds a certain threshold,
and that have a positive correlation with a, are taken into account.
In [46], O’Donovan and Smyth showed that trust-based filtering achieves better
accuracy than collaborative filtering in terms of average errors. Moreover, the al-
gorithm based on profile-level trust yields lower errors than collaborative filtering
in nearly 70% of all prediction cases.
O’Donovan’s method is a representative example in the group of strategies that
use automatic trust generation. A related approach can be found in [30], which
works with an utilitarian measure instead of a binary correctness function.
20.3.3 Empirical Comparison
One question that stands out is which of the state-of-the-art approaches discussed
above performs best in practice. Basically, so far, researchers in the trust-based rec-
ommender field introduced their own new algorithms and evaluated these on their
own applications and/or data sets, without including a comparison of other trust-
enhanced approaches based on the same data set/application. Therefore, in the re-
mainder of this section, we provide a head-to-head comparison of the performance
that the previously discussed trust-enhanced techniques can achieve on one and the
same data set. We focus on Golbeck’s trust-based weighted mean with TidalTrust
(Eq. (20.1)), Massa’s trust-based collaborative filtering with MoleTrust (Eq. (20.4)),
and O’Donovan’s trust-based filtering (Eq. (20.5)). Since our goal is to compare all
techniques on the same data sets and to investigate the influence of trust propagation,
we have chosen not to implement O’Donovan’s automatic trust generation strategy,
but to mine the same trust network as the other two strategies. Although O’Donovan
et al. do not use trust propagation in their experiments [46], it is of course possible
to do so. Since there is no explicit use of trust values in (20.5), we only need to
specify how propagation enlarges RT+ (see below).
20.3.3.1 Data Sets
The data sets we use in our experiments are obtained from Epinions.com, a popular
e-commerce site where users can write reviews about consumer products and assign
a rating to the products and the reviews. Two Epinions data sets are often used for ex-
perimenting with trust-enhanced recommender systems. The first one was collected
by Massa and Bhattacharjee [39] in a 5-week crawl and contains 139 738 products
that are rated by 49 290 users in total; the consumer products are rated on a scale
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from 1 to 5. The second data set was compiled by Guha et al. [21]: this large data
set contains 1 560 144 reviews that received 25 170 637 ratings by 163 634 differ-
ent users. The reviews are evaluated by assigning a helpfulness rating which ranges
from ‘not helpful’ (1/5) to ‘most helpful’ (5/5). This data set does not contain any
information about consumer products and product ratings, but works with reviews
and review ratings instead; in other words, for this data set, we discuss and evaluate
a ‘review recommender system’. Hence, in the context of Guha’s set, an item de-
notes a review of consumer goods, whereas for the crawled data set an item denotes
a consumer product.
In our experiments we focus on the number of recommendations/predictions that
can be generated by the systems and on the prediction errors, for random items
as well as controversial items. The latter are the most challenging items for a rec-
ommender system, since it is much harder to predict a score for an item that has
received a variety of high and low scores, reflecting disagreement about the item.
More than in any other case, a recommendation for a user needs to be truly per-
sonalized when the target item under consideration is controversial; i.e., when an
item has both ‘ardent supporters’ and ‘motivated adversaries’, with no clear major-
ity in either group. In [63], Victor et al. explain why classical standard deviation is
not sufficient to detect the true controversial items in a data set, and propose a new
measure to define the controversiality level of a particular item. Their methodology
leads to 1 416 controversial items in Guha’s data set, and 266 in Massa’s data set.
We refer to [63] for more details about the controversiality computation. To com-
pare the performance achieved for controversial items (CIs) with the performance
that can be obtained in general, we also present the average coverage and accuracy
for 1 416 and 266 randomly selected ‘popular’ items (RIs) (that have been evaluated
at least 20 times, analogous to the controversial items).
Epinions allows users to evaluate other users based on the quality of their reviews,
and to provide trust and distrust evaluations in addition to ratings. The fact that both
data sets contain explicit trust information from the users makes them very appro-
priate to study issues in trust-enhanced recommender systems. Users can evaluate
other users by including them in their WOT (i.e. a list of reviewers whose reviews
and ratings were consistently found to be valuable7), or by putting them in their
block list (a list of authors whose reviews were consistently found to be offensive,
inaccurate or low quality7, thus indicating distrust). In Guha’s data set, the trust eval-
uations make up an Epinions WOT graph consisting of 114 222 users and 717 129
non self-referring trust relations. Massa’s data set contains information on 49 288
users who issued or received 487 003 trust statements in total.
Note that the data sets only contain binary trust values, hence in our experiments
ta;u in (20.1), (20.4) and (20.5) can take on the values 0 (absence of trust) and 1
(full presence) only. This limitation leads to alterations of some of the trust-basesd
algorithms; e.g., Formula (20.1) reduces to the classical average. For simplicity, we
7 See www.epinions.com/help/faq/
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only consider one-step propagation in this paper. This means that for the propa-
gated versions of (20.4) and (20.5), we consider chains of length 1 and 2, whereas
for (20.2) we only consider chains of length 2 when there are no shorter chains
available. These two simplifications put a restriction on our empirical comparison,
because we cannot analyse the algorithms exactly as they were meant/designed to
be.
20.3.3.2 Coverage
Coverage refers to the number of target user - target item pairs for which a predic-
tion can be generated. A classical way to measure the coverage of a recommender
system is by using the leave-one-out method, which consists of hiding a rating and
trying to predict its hidden value. The coverage of a specific algorithm then refers
to the amount of computable predictions pa;i versus the number of leave-one-out
experiments to perform (i.e., the number of ratings available in the data set). For
Formula (20.3) we call pa;i computable if there is at least one user u for which the
PCC wa;u can be calculated, while for Formulas (20.1) and (20.4) a computable pa;i
means that there is at least one user u for which the (propagated) trust estimate ta;u
can be calculated. Finally, for Formula (20.5), predictions are possible when at least
one user u is found for which the PCC can be computed and ta;u is 1.
Table 20.3 shows the coverage (% COV) for controversial items (CIs) and randomly
selected items (RIs) in Guha’s and Massa’s data sets. The first four rows cover base-
line strategies (B1)–(B4). The first baseline strategy is a system that always predicts
5/5 (B1), since this is the predominant score for items in Epinions. The second sys-
tem computes the average received rating for the target item (B2), while the third
one yields the average rating given by target user a (B3). The latter method will
score well in a system where the users have a rating behaviour with little variation.
Finally, the last baseline returns a random helpfulness score between 1 and 5 (B4).
In general, baselines (B1), (B2) and (B4) achieve maximal coverage for both con-
troversial and randomly selected items: (B1) and (B4) do not rely on any additional
(trust or PCC) information, and since the items in our experiments are evaluated at
least 20 times, it is always possible to compute (B2). With (B3), in those cases in
which the target user rated only one item, his average rating is lacking, so a predic-
tion cannot be generated.
For the other algorithms in Table 20.3, the numbers in the first column refer to
the corresponding recommendation formulas given above. For the trust-enhanced
approaches, we distinguish between experiments that did not use propagated trust
information (higher rows) and those that did (bottom rows). We only consider one-
step propagation: for (P1) and (P4), we maintained the propagation strategy used in
20 Trust and Recommendations 667
TidalTrust and MoleTrust8 respectively, while for (P5) we added a user to RT if he
belongs to theWOT of the target user a, or is directly trusted by a WOT member of a.
Without propagation, it is clear that the coverage of the collaborative filtering
algorithm is superior to that of the others, and approaches the maximal value. This is
due to the fact that PCC information is, in general, more readily available than direct
trust information: there are normally more users for which a positive correlation
with the target user a can be computed than users in a’s WOT. On the other hand,
trust-based filtering (20.5), which also uses PCC weights, is the most demanding
strategy because it requires users in a’s WOT who have already rated two other
items in common with a (otherwise the PCC can not be computed). In between these
extremes, the coverage for TidalTrust (20.1) is a bit higher than that of MoleTrust
(20.4) because the latter can only generate predictions for target users who have
rated at least two items, otherwise the average rating for the target user can not be
computed).
This ranking of approaches in terms of coverage still applies when propagated
trust information is taken into account, but note that the difference with collabo-
rative filtering has shrunk considerably. In particular, thanks to trust propagation,
the coverage increases with about 25% (10%) for controversial (randomly selected)
items in the first set, and more than 30% in the second set.
For Guha’s data set, the coverage results for controversial items are significantly
lower than those for randomly selected items. This is due to the fact that, on average,
controversial items in this data set receive less ratings than randomly selected items,
which yields less leave-one-out experiments per item, but also a smaller chance that
such an item was rated by a user with whom the target user a has a positive PCC, or
by a user that a trusts. This also explains the lower coverage results for the nontriv-
ial recommendation strategies. The same observations cannot be made for Massa’s
data set: on average, the CIs receive more ratings than the RIs (21 131 vs. 12 741).
This explains the somewhat lower coverage performance of the algorithms on the
random item set.
Also remark that the coverage results for Massa’s data set are significantly lower
in general than those for Guha’s; (20.1), (20.4) and (20.5) achieve a coverage that
is at least 20% worse. Users in Guha’s data set rate much more items than users
in Massa’s data set, which yields less users who have rated the same items, i.e.,
neighbours (through trust or PCC) that are needed in the computation.
20.3.3.3 Accuracy
As with coverage, the accuracy of a recommender system is typically assessed
by using the leave-one-out method, more in particular by determining the devia-
tion between the hiding ratings and the predicted ratings. In particular, we use two
well-known measures, viz. mean absolute error (MAE) and root mean squared error
8 Note that we incorporate Massa et al.’s horizon-based strategy for binary trust settings [35].
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(RMSE) [22]. The first measure considers every error of equal value, while the latter
one emphasizes larger errors. Since reviews and products are rated on a scale from
1 to 5, the extreme values that MAE and RMSE can reach are 0 and 4. Even small
improvements in RMSE are considered valuable in the context of recommender sys-
tems. For example the Netflix prize competition9 offers a $1 000 000 reward for a
reduction of the RMSE by 10%.
The MAE and RMSE reported in Table 20.3 is overall higher for the controver-
sial items than for the randomly selected items. In other words, generating good
predictions for controversial items is much harder than for randomly chosen items.
This applies to all the algorithms, but most clearly to the baseline strategies (except
(B4)). While in Massa’s data set all algorithms adjust themselves in more or less
the same way, in Guha’s data set (B1) and (B2) clearly experience more difficulties
when generating predictions for controversial items: whereas for random items they
are competitive with collaborative filtering and the trust-enhanced approaches, their
MAE and RMSE on the controversial item set increase with more than 1 on the
rating scale from 1 to 5.
Also note that it is more difficult to generate good recommendations in Massa’s
data set than in Guha’s, for controversial as well as random items. This is due to the
higher inherent controversiality level of the former data set.
When focusing on the MAE of the non-baseline approaches for controversial items,
we notice that, without propagation, trust-enhanced approaches all yield better re-
sults than collaborative filtering10 (with one exception for trust-based filtering on
Massa’s CIs), which is in accordance with the observations made in [15, 36]. This
can be attributed to the accuracy/coverage trade-off: a coverage increase is usually
at the expense of accuracy, and vice versa. It also becomes clear when taking into
account trust propagation: as the coverage of the trust-enhanced algorithms nears
that of the collaborative filtering algorithm, so do the MAEs.
However, the RMSEs give us a different picture. On the controversial item sets,
the RMSE of the trust-enhanced approaches is generally higher than that of collabo-
rative filtering, which does not always occur on the random sets; recall that a higher
RMSE means that more large prediction errors occur. One possible explanation for
this is the fact that, for controversial items, the set RT of trusted acquaintances that
have rated the target item is too small (e.g., contains only 1 user), and in particular
smaller than R+. This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that with trust prop-
agation (which enlarges RT ) RMSEs rise at a slower rate than the corresponding
MAEs. Moreover, it is often the case that the propagated algorithms achieve lower
RMSEs than their unpropagated counterparts, see e.g. the results on controversial
items in Massa’s data set.
9 See http://www.netflixprize.com/
10 Note that all the MAE improvements on Guha’s data set are statistically significant (p< 0:000).
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20.3.3.4 Conclusion
The experiments on both Epinions data sets, each with their own characteristics, en-
dorse the same conclusions. For random items, intelligent strategies such as collabo-
rative filtering and trust-based algorithms barely outperform the baselines. However,
the baselines fall short in generating good recommendations for controversial items.
Trust-enhanced systems perform better in this respect, although there is certainly
still room for improvement; remember the higher RMSEs and the fact that trust-
based approaches on Massa’s CIs yield no visible improvements over collaborative
filtering. These findings call for further research on improving the algorithms and
identifying specific cases where trust approaches are effective (think e.g. of Massa
et al.’s results for cold start users).
The coverage and accuracy results show no clear winner among the three state-
of-the-art trust-enhanced strategies proposed by Golbeck et al., Massa et al., and
O’Donovan et al. Trust-based collaborative filtering seems to score best on Massa’s
data set, while trust-based weighted mean and trust-based filtering achieve the best
accuracy on Guha’s data set; this trend is also confirmed by the results obtained by
propagation.
The two data sets contain rating information and trust information, which makes
them popular in trust-enhanced recommender experiments. However, they have one
shortcoming: the trust values in Epinions are binary, making it impossible to inves-
tigate all aspects of the algorithms we discussed in this chapter, since a lot of the
existing trust-based approaches are based on the assumption that trust is a gradual
concept. Unfortunately, there are no such data sets publicly available.
20.4 Recent Developments and Open Challenges
In the previous sections we have covered the basics of trust modeling, trust metrics,
and trust-enhanced recommender systems. In this section, we want to give the reader
a foretaste of new directions in the research area of trust-based recommendation sys-
tems. This is certainly not meant to be a complete overview, but rather a selection of
recent developments in the field. In particular, we will briefly discuss the following
issues: alleviating the trust-based cold start problem, visualization of trust-enhanced
recommender systems, theoretical foundations for trust-based research, and involv-
ing distrust in the recommendation process.
Massa and Avesani have shown that the user cold start problem in classical rec-
ommender systems can be alleviated by including a trust network among its users.
They demonstrated that, for new users, it is more beneficial to issue a few trust
statements (compared to rating some items) in order to get good recommendations
from the system [35]. However, Victor et al. have shown that cold start users in the
classical sense (who rated only a few items) are very often cold start users in the
trust sense as well [61]. Hence, new users must be encouraged to connect to other
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users to expand the trust network as soon as possible, but choosing whom to con-
nect to is often a difficult task. Given the impact this choice has on the delivered
recommendations, it is critical to guide newcomers through this early stage connec-
tion process. In [61] this problem is tackled by identifying three types of key figures
in the recommender system’s network, viz. frequent raters, mavens and connectors.
The authors show that, for a cold start user, connecting to one of the identified key
figures is much more advantageous than including a randomly chosen user, with re-
spect to coverage as well as accuracy of the generated recommendations.
Remark that these connection guidance issues link up with the broader problem
of trust bootstrapping, i.e., the problem of how to establish initial trust relations in
the network. O’Donovan, too, addresses this problem, but in a very different way:
he introduces PeerChooser, a new procedure to visualize a trust-based collaborative
filtering recommender system [45]. More specifically, PeerChooser visualizes both
information coming from the traditional similarity measure PCC, and information
coming from the underlying trust-space generated fom the rating data (remember
O’Donovan’s profile- and item-level trust [46]). One of the main features of the sys-
tem is its possiblity to extract trust information on the fly, directly from the user at
recommendation time. This is done by moving specific icons (representing users in
the system) on an interactive interface. In this way, the user can indicate his mood
and preferences, thereby actively providing real-time trust information.
There are also other ways to establish trust relations when the information is not
explicitly given by the users. Several sources of social data can be consulted, such
as online friend and business networks (think e.g. of Facebook or LinkedIn), e-mail
communication, reputation systems, etc. In the recommender system literature, they
are often lumped together and collectively referred to as trust, although they map
onto different concepts: behavioral theory clearly draws a distinction between ho-
mophily or cognitive similarity (similarity between people/tastes/etc.), social capital
(reputation, opinion leadership), tie strength (in terms of relationship duration and
interaction frequency), and trust (see e.g. [40, 41]). Potentially all these social data
sources could be incorporated into a (trust-enhanced) recommender system, but so
far not much research has been conducted to find out which ones will be most use-
ful [4], and whether these sources would provide similar results as the classical
trust-based recommendation approaches discussed in this chapter. In [5], Arazy et
al. embark upon this problem and argue that the design of social recommenders
should be grounded in theory, rather than making ad hoc design choices as is often
the case in current algorithms.
Another recent research direction of a completely different nature is the investiga-
tion of the potential of distrust in trust-based recommender systems. Whereas in the
trust modeling domain only a few attempts have been made to incorporate distrust,
in the recommender domain this is even less so. This is due to several reasons, the
most important ones being that very few data sets containing distrust information
are available, and that there is no general consensus yet about how to propagate it
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and to use it for recommendation purposes. A first experimental evaluation of the
effects of involving distrust in the recommendation process is reported in [64]. In
this paper, three distrust strategies are investigated, viz. distrust as an indicator to
reverse deviations, distrust as a filter for neighbour selection, and distrust as a de-
bugger of a web of trust. The first two strategies are based on the rationale that trust
can be used to select similar users (neighbours) in collaborative filtering systems,
while the latter strategy has been suggested by various researchers in the field, see
e.g. [20, 68]. The results indicate that the first technique is not the line to take. Dis-
trust as a filter and/or debugger looks more promising, but it is clear that much work
remains to be done in this nascent research area before one can come to a more
precise conclusion.
20.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have given an introduction to the research area of trust modeling,
and illustrated how trust networks can improve the performance of classical recom-
mender systems. We discussed several state-of-the-art implementations of these so-
called trust-enhanced recommender strategies, and provided an experimental eval-
uation of their performance on two data sets from Epinions.com. This comparison
in terms of coverage and accuracy did not yield any clear winner, but did show that
each of the algorithms has its own merits.
Recommender applications that maintain a social trust network among their users
can benefit from trust propagation strategies that have proven to yield a surplus
value, whereas in cases where it is not immediately possible to collect explicit trust
statements, methods that are able to automatically compute trust values seem the
most ideal solution. Of course, these strategies could not have been devised without
the appropriate data sets and/or applications to experiment with.
In fact, one of the main difficulties in the trust-enhanced recommender research
domain is the lack of publicly available and suitable test data. Hence, it is our hope
that in the near future more such data and applications become within reach of every
researcher in need of it, and we strongly believe that this will attract and inspire even
more people, thereby stimulating the research in this thriving area of trust-based
recommendation.
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